Parliamentary election in Kazakhstan took place two months ago but political tension in the country does not abate. Unfortunately, the election failed to accomplish its most important objective and create a foundation for consolidation of the elite and society. On the contrary, the gap between the authorities and the opposition is widening, and even the political elite is no longer monolithic.

Zharmakhan Tuyakbai, ex-chairman of the lower house of the parliament and one of the leaders of the pro-presidential Otan (the party that came in first in the election), accused the authorities of foul play. His unexpected demarche was but another link in the chain of the events that began in 2001 when economic interests of a part of the political and business elites collided with the interests of a certain member of the president's family. The collision resulted in appearance of new public politicians and political parties in Kazakhstan. Most probably, Tuyakbai's maneuver does not have anything to do with the struggle for democratic values despite what some activists of the opposition are saying. It is probably a corollary of the conflict with Imangali Tasmagambetov, chief of the presidential administration who is fortifying his positions much to the chagrin of many representatives of the political establishment. Before Tuyakbai, a similar trajectory was executed by former "member of the presidential team" Zamanbek Nurkadilov and the men who are leaders of Ak Zhol party nowadays. There was also Prime Minister Akezhan Kazhegeldin, who turned the page of "a great exodus from under the president" in order to challenge the regime. Force was used against Kazhegeldin once but not against Nurkadilov. The use of force against Tuyakbai is also unlikely. The latter two know too much. The president wants them where he can see them clearly, without provoking their potential consolidation with the opposition.

What really counts is that President Nursultan Nazarbayev is gradually losing the role of arbiter in the relations among the elite. The corporate political system he has built around himself is undergoing a transformation into a more and more complex organism. It includes very many ambitious "backstage players" energetically demanding freedom of economic and political action. Meanwhile, these players fear another redistribution of property which will be inevitable as soon as Nazarbayev steps down. Even that, however, is not the worst trouble. It probably irks and worries the president that he is gradually losing control over the elite, and that causes malfunctioning of the traditional mechanism of finding a consensus between interests of numerous power groups. By the way, this was one of the reasons of Tuyakbai's transformation into a public politician in the first place. He could hardly afford it in the wake of the 1991 parliamentary or presidential elections when Nazarbayev's positions were stronger.

The largest political parties in Kazakhstan are a symbiosis of financial-industrial groups and political establishment fighting over the president's ear. The victory of Otan (the ruling party) may be regarded as a triumph of several groups of influence and regional elites. Among the winners are the tandem of Tasmagambetov and Alexander Mashkevich's Eurasian Group that stand behind Otan and the Civil Party. The losers include Ak Zhol and the group of Kazcommercebank behind it, and Dariga Nazarbayeva with her Project Asar. The situation being what it is, observers are stunned by the conflict between one of Ak Zhol chairmen Altynbek Sarsenbayev and Nazarbayeva over the media holding controlled by the daughter of the president. It seems that the tandem of Tasmagambetov and Mashkevich will come out winner in the conflict between Sarsenbayev and Nazarbayeva. The tandem already delivered several serious information blows at Kazcommercebank during the elections. Stability of the tandem is a different matter. It is already the enemy of other groups of influence thinking in terms of the future of the political system after Nazarbayev. This future worries the "old guard" like Nurtai Abykayev, Akhmetzhan Yesimov, or Sarybai Kalmurzayev, and "the youth" like members of the family of the president Timur Kulibayev and Rakhat Aliyev who bide their time at this point.

As for the president himself, he has already put some countermeasures into motion. For starters, the new parliament whose legitimacy was questioned by the opposition and representatives of the political establishment began its work a month ahead of schedule. The president decided that the political pause was much too long. Rumors on insecurity and even confusion of the national leader began circulating, and Nazarbayev decided not to wait for December 1, the day the new parliament was to commence work. Ak Zhol initiated a referendum on invalidation of the outcome of the election, providing the president with another excuse to stop dawdling. The president counterattacked by having the parliament amend the law "On referendums" and necessitate state registration of the referendum initiative group. In short, the president needs a loyal and obedient parliament. Observers comment on the aggressiveness with which the authorities formed a pro-presidential majority in the parliament. The aggressiveness in question is an indication of Nazarbayev's intention to use the parliament in promotion of his legislative initiatives that may stipulate an early presidential election and amendment of the Constitution. This assumption is merely confirmed by promotion of Ural Mukhamedzhanov, state inspector of the directorate of control and staff policy of the presidential administration, to the post of chairman of the lower house of the parliament.

In the meantime, the president put into motion his plan of restoration of parity within the elite. A message was sent to all backstage players. Opening the first meeting of the third parliament, Nazarbayev mentioned "10 megaholdings" controlling 80% of the national GDP and preventing transparency of and competition in the domestic market. Some of these holdings aspire for power, the president said. Nazarbayev deliberately called these men "oligarchs", stressing his own negative attitude. As a matter of fact, all these "oligarchs" were reared by the president himself and became a part of the national political system long ago. All the same, Nazarbayev's words may be viewed as a warning to whoever was trying not to play by the rules. Some observers do not rule out the possibility that the "war on oligarchs" will become one of the central theses of Nazarbayev's election campaign. In fact, the president already went public with what may be viewed as a program speech.

On the other hand, foreign investors find life in Kazakhstan hard nowadays. They are put under pressure for the sake of the local business elite that has long aspired for its own slice of the oil and gas pie controlled by foreign investors. The law "On investments" passed a couple of years ago abolished Article 6 of the law "On foreign investments" that does not permit the state to any actions worsening the position of investors. The new law made domestic and foreign investors equal. The recent endorsement of amendments to the laws on the interior of the land became a logical conclusion of the process. The state, i.e. KazMunaiGaz, has an official privilege now in buying investors out. It is clear that the amendment is motivated by the current economic situation. It is supposed to help the government in its talks with British Gas over its share in the North-Caspian oil project. On the other hand, all of that may be regarded as support of oligarchs. Some political scientists say that burdened with too much by way of capitals (most of them shadow capitals, that is), the Kazakh elite is frantically looking for new spheres - not only where foreign investors are already involved but also in the nearby Kyrgyzstan and Russia.

The president has one other time-proved method of keeping the elite in hand. The matter concerns staff shuffles. Consider Tasmagambetov, for example, who may remain the head of the presidential administration and therefore control the election headquarters or may be shifted elsewhere to placate the opposition whose criticism cannot very well be ignored anymore. At the same time, it will be wrong to overestimate Tasmagambetov's survival potential. Should the president start seeing him as a potential threat to the stability of the elite, he can always get rid of Tasmagambetov the way he got rid of his son-in-law Aliyev. As for the shuffles themselves, it is the same old deck that will be shuffled, provided nobody from Ak Zhol decides to return to the government. Judging by the pause Ak Zhol kept during Tuyakbai's demarche, negotiations over it did take place. The opposition is unlikely to be satisfied with participation in the work of the new national commission for democratization and civic society under the president. As for consolidation of the opposition, chances of this coalition are gauged at fifty-fifty. Some negotiations between three parties of the opposition are supposed to be under way - negotiations over a single candidate, that is. The problem is, all forces of the opposition have different objectives. Ak Zhol is still bargaining and would not balk at making a political deal with the regime, while the other two parties are much more radical. They will fight for political survival between the parliamentary and presidential elections. In fact, the opposition should be ready for the possibility that the president may try to amend the party system of Kazakhstan. According to Nazarbayev, experience of many countries of "the third echelon on modernization" (most young democracies in Asia, that is) shows that the dash from the periphery of global development necessitate dominance of a certain political party.

The parliamentary election leaves no doubts as to what political party will be placed in the center of the party system. The situation being what it is, the opposition can but unite.

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About the author: Dosym Satpayev - political scientist, Director of ARG (Risk Assessment Group).