Analysis of history of the peoples of Central Asia as presented by the Russian and regional historiography reveals a number of distinctive features typical of domestic and, broader, post-Soviet science. Particularly distinctive of them include an appeal to the sources of establishment of ethnic national statehood, historical geography, ethnogenesis of peoples and their relations with other peoples (first and foremost, neighbors) in centuries. Regrettably as it is, a serious and objective approach to complicated problems, and frequently conflict bearing ones, goes along with what does not really have anything to do with science.

All this speculations are indulged in on a scope that corresponds to the phase of history. Considerable importance has been attached to interpretation of development of the Central Asian peoples and their statehood ever since the former Soviet republics gained sovereignty. Moreover, we are talking ideological and sociopolitical interpretation.

A throwback to the late USSR, history in the post-Soviet zone is turning from a science into an ideological and political tool in the arsenals of the powers-that-be. The process is particularly undeniable in the CIS states where progress in the direction of democracy has been abandoned in favor of establishment of all sorts of quasi-democratic moulages and repressive regimes. First and foremost, it concerns sociopolitical development of the Central Asian states. Practically none of them has established civil society. Even worse, democracy and what it is supposed to imply are interpreted to fit the existing regimes and reinforce them ideologically.

Whoever studies history for pure scientific purposes is encountering problems nowadays. There is a whole bunch of official historiographers in Russia and Central Asian countries nowadays. What passes for their professional training is really something: back in the Soviet Union, most of them specialized in "foreign policy of the USSR", "scientific communism", or "objectively positive role of the Russian Empire". Practically all of them belonged to the nomenclature in academic or CPSU circles. Granted that their arguments vary from the ostentatiously liberal theses on "non-linear development of history" to calls for "considerate evaluations" of episodes and events to extreme chauvinism, their views are actually conservative and adaptable to the needs of the moment; their professionalism is veritably weak. Ethnocentric patterns of development promoted by them bring to mind George Orwell's famous thesis that "every nationalist is haunted by the idea that the past may - and should be - amended."

Analysis of the teaching aids and research work on the role and the place of the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and USSR in history of these peoples published in Central Asian states enables analysts to draw certain interim conclusions. Along with everything else, they concern the perception of these processes by the Russian political establishment and general public and the way Russian media outlets cover concepts of national history as presented by Central Asian scientists.

First, the Russians display extremely poor knowledge of the contextual (as opposed to selective) interpretation of specific events and facts and defamatory nature of accusations against modern national historiography of certain states.

Second, public consciousness is being undeniably brainwashed into acceptance of artificial models. Having nothing to do with realities, they are supposed to strengthen the existing concepts that distort the true history of the peoples of the region in the interests of the political establishments.

Third, incompetence and professional inadequacy attributed to poor knowledge of history, historical geography, ethnology, language, and traditions of the peoples of the region generate "political myths" and enables neophytes to dabble in scientific problems.

Fourth, political arguments are pushed into background, ones that are convenient at the particular moment and confrontationist in form and content, ones that distort facts for the purposes of proving their validity.

Needless to say, all of that does not apply to the genuine scientific works, rare as they are, whose authors study both little and broadly known (or so it may seem) facts.

National historiography of some Central Asian countries is in a tight fix as well. On the one hand, there existed a specific political order that did not accept genuinely scientific arguments. On the other, the necessity of new approaches to the problems either forgotten by official Soviet historiography or ideologically interpreted became plain undeniable.

Analysis of specific materials presented because of their social and scientific importance as teaching aids and of the works that are important for public opinion in Central Asian countries offers some serious food for thought and fields of study of particularly this aspect of history.

A diligent observer may single out some major distinctive features of historiography of the new independent states of the Central Asian region. Kyrgyz historians for instance have never questioned advantages of Russia's presence on the territory of modern Kyrgyzstan throughout the years of sovereignty. What they criticize, albeit cautiously, is how the Kyrgyzes were treated in the Russian Empire (the way newcomers drove the autochthonous population out, the deliberate policy aimed to escalate tension in the relations between the Kyrgyz and neighbor peoples) and how Central Asia was divided into ethnic territories in the Soviet Union.

Tajik historians in their studies and teaching aids dated after completion of civil war in 1997 are generally favorable in evaluation of the role Russia and the USSR played in restoration (that's how they invariably treat the phenomenon) of Tajik national statehood. This positive evaluation does not include a number of events in connection with what they brand as the Soviet Union's patronization of Uzbekistan that enabled the latter to expand its territory at the cost of the ancestral Tajik lands (that's what Tajik historians call them). A special attention is being paid to the actions of the Uzbek leadership aimed to denationalize Tajik history both in the period of existence of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and afterwards i.e. nowadays.

The situation in Turkmenistan is particularly difficult and dramatic for history and historians. The late president Saparmurat Niyazov installed an authoritarian-totalitarian regime and became its prime ideologist. Niyazov alone was permitted to interpret national history. Where the Russian-Turkmen relations and the role of the USSR in development of Turkmenistan as a state were concerned, all evaluations were extremely negative, bordering on outright hostility. No other construction was allowed. The cult of Niyazov (the Turkmenbashi) was established. Niyazov was hailed as the author of the Rukhnama, a book that provided foundations for propaganda in absolutely all humanitarian sciences.

The late leader's outlook and degree of knowledge of history are clearly defined in this particular book and in his speech in front of Turkmen students on December 1, 2000, titled "Neutrality of Turkmenistan: history, outlook, and state strategy". Here are some theses from the speech: "Ancient Turkmen or proto-Turkmen states of Altyn-depe, Margush, Parfia, Margiana, Urgench, and others have defined to a considerable extent the nature of political, economic, and cultural life of the West, degree of relations between the East and the West, the North and the South ever since the third millennium B.C.", "Historians maintain that the Turkmens in the Medieval ages were directly involved in establishment of about 70 states on the territory from the Hindustan to the Mediterranean Sea", "We were part of the USSR for 70 years, the period when our economy crumbled. Granted that we were initiated into culture, science, world values, and arts, we gradually lost our independence..."

Directly controlled and supervised by Niyazov himself, the local Institute of History was diligently looking for ancient evidence of Turkmen greatness. One Janbekov of the National Institute of Manuscripts once said, "We are scrutinizing ancient manuscripts written in the Turkmen and other languages. We have already rediscovered a constellation of outstanding scientists and poets, our compatriots, historians regard as representatives of other nations. We will keep working on it. I do not doubt that we will return a great deal of authors and their invaluable masterpieces to Turkmenistan's legacy yet."

Most historians found life unbelievable hard under Niyazov's dictatorship. Sciences were all but banned save for archaeology - and even that was supervised by the authorities.

Let us now consider Uzbekistan and the situation the science of history found itself in there. For the authorities and President Islam Karimov, national history has been an instrument of indoctrination of general public and its mobilization in their own interests ever since establishment of the sovereign state of Uzbekistan. The process became even more noticeable after 1993-1994 when establishment of a thoroughly authoritarian regime intensified in the country to be completed by the late 1990's. A special emphasis was made on a hypertrophied and selective presentation of Timur the conqueror praised as a great statesman and warlord who put into motion the process of Uzbek statehood. Timur was never referred to as Tamerlan which was essentially a derivative from Timurleng or Timur the Lame.

Dwelling on the problems of "ideologization of history" in Central Asia, specialists say that Uzbekistan becomes outright absurd in its worship of Tamerlan. Local historians maintain with utmost seriousness that NATO owes its existence to Timur and nobody else. This particular line of reasoning goes as follows: Tamerlan stopped the Tatar-Mongol invasion, permitting Europe to indulge in discovery of new lands that resulted in discovery of America which pooled efforts with West Europe afterwards and that was how the Alliance was established.

As for the foreign policy of the Russian Empire in Central Asia which was essentially a policy of colonizers, some Uzbek authors maintain that it was an anti-Uzbek policy first and foremost, a policy aimed against state formations like the Bukhara emirate and Kokand and Khiva khanates. The 1916 revolt in Central Asia is presented as regional but the guiding role in it is attributed to the Uzbeks. Resistance to the Soviet power in its first years of its existence is interpreted as national liberation movement in Central Asia, without so much as lip service paid to its regional, ethnic political, and social features. Once again, the part the Uzbek ethnic element played in it is inordinately exaggerated.

Establishment of Uzbek statehood in the years of existence of the USSR and territorial contours of modern Uzbekistan shaped then are never studied.

Some history textbooks make an emphasis on Uzbekistan's participation in WWII when Uzbekistan was but a republic of the Soviet Union. Written in the Uzbek language and classified teaching aids used in indoctrination of officers of the Uzbek Armed Forces until 2005 included paragraphs that extolled the Turkestan legion and some Uzbek military units of the Wehrmacht as predecessor of the national Armed Forces.

The notorious Cotton Case is regarded in Uzbekistan as fabricated in order to offend the Uzbek people. The activities of Sharaf Rashidov, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan in the USSR, is eulogized at the official level.

When Tashkent's relations with the United States and Europe soured over how the Uzbek authorities crushed the revolt in Andijan in May 2005, Uzbekistan abandoned particularly odious anti-Russian "historical-propagandistic" theses. It was clearly done to secure Russia's support. Some teaching aids including outrageous invectives were withdrawn from the lists of recommended literature. In general, however, the authorities' tools in the field of "political archaeology" remained the same. At the regional level, Uzbekistan keeps squabbling with its neighbors over ethnic-national and geographic issues.

Shortly speaking, the Central Asian regimes use the four following issues to promote their own political objectives:

- policy of the Russian Empire and USSR (Soviet Russia) with regard to these peoples and countries;

- actions of the colonial and Soviet administrations in these territories;

- establishment of states of the Central Asian region and the role the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and the USSR played in it; and

- actions of the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and the USSR in the spheres of culture and education.

Local historians frequently use actual facts and events and determine the cause and effect correctly. The Russian standpoint in this particular context should be based on two facts and not on emotions. The facts in question are as follows.

First, the Russian Federation as it is nowadays is not responsible for what was done by the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, and the USSR. It means that colonial wars and annexation of territories (unjust from the point of view of Central Asian peoples) cannot be approved, justified, or praised as promotion of modern Russian interests - and much less as a "glorious chapter of the Russian history". Scientifically speaking, suggestion of these theses is clearly political and biased.

Second, modern Russia is not supposed to use events of the past it was not involved in as a political argument in the relations with the countries of the region. In other words, it should not discuss at the political level whatever has to do with realities of the Russian Empire, Soviet Russia, or the USSR. After all, it is an equal partner of the CIS states with which it comprised a single state once.

The only way out is offered by scientific studies in Russia devoid of any administrative or political supervision, studies concentrating on the following issues: absence of historic foundation of a number of modern states; policy of depopulation with regard to other ethnic groups on the territories of modern states in different phases of history including when they were parts of other states.

Abandonment of attempts to draw a real or imaginary "dialectic connection" between politics and history (with the latter having its own perception of processes past and present) will do away with propagandistic campaigns and mutual accusations. History belongs to peoples. It is historians and not propagandists who should be involved.