Gazprom CEO Aleksei Miller will fly to Uzbekistan, today. He intends to discuss transfer of three major gas field to Gazprom with President Islam Karimov. Signing of the accords will make the Russian company a monopolist in the sphere of gas export from Uzbekistan. Official Tashkent does not demand much in return - only guarantees that Russia will help Uzbekistan crush the opposition and defend it from the West.

First and foremost, gas

Miller is going to Uzbekistan to finalize the accords on gas fields in Urga, Kuanysh, and Akchalak that are to be turned over to Gazprom. Work in the gas fields in question will enable Gazprom to boost import of gas from Uzbekistan from 5-6 billion cubic meters to 17-18 billion cubic meters. Miller will discuss the matter with Karimov himself, the fact that plainly shows the importance Gazprom attaches to the talks.

Gazprom is already working in Shakhpaty, a gas field on Ust-Yurt Plateau not far from Kungrad, but 500 million cubic meters of gas a year are all it has show for it. As for the new gas fields, Gazprom intends to invest nearly $1.2 billion in them.

The signing of the accords (Gazprom expects them to be signed either at the summit of the Eurasian Economic Cooperation in St.Petersburg or by the end of March, 2006) will make the Russian company the foremost player in the sphere of Uzbek gas export. Trinity Energy of Great Britain and a consortium of LUKOIL and Itera are working side by side with Gazprom on the plateau (they deal in oil, not gas). Uzbekneftegaz's structures produce almost 54 billion cubic meters of gas every year but gas export is limited by capacities of transportation systems of Uzbekistan itself and nearby Kazakhstan. Moreover, gas export from Uzbekistan is already controlled by Gazprom (it intends to buy up to 7 billion cubic meters this year) that pipes the Turkmen gas on the territory of the republic. The gas for Uzbekistan's own purposes is mostly produced in Kandym (Bukhara region) and Shurta (Kashkadarja region).

The signing of the accords will make Gazprom a de facto monopolist in the sphere of gas export from Uzbekistan. Itera entertained certain gas production and export plans once. Enron intended to invest up to $2 million in the Kandym gas production infrastructure in the middle of the 1990's but its gas project with Uzbekistan ended in a fiasco. It seems that Uzbekistan intends to put Gazprom in charge of all gas fields in Ust-Yurt (work is currently under way on an accord between Gazprom and Uzbekneftegaz on principles of geological survey; at least eight considerable gas fields around Kungrad remain to be surveyed yet).

Negotiations over Ust-Yurt gas fields have already taken more than four years. Once the accord is signed, Gazprom will be safe (more or less) from consequences of a gas production fall in Turkmenistan. The deal looks fairly attractive to Uzbekistan since it does not have money to work the gas fields and, even more importantly, to build up running capacity of the gas pipelines from Central Asia to the rest of the world.

Protocol event

The Russian-Uzbek rapprochement in the gas sphere is taking place on the eve of Karimov's visit to Russia. He will attend the Eurasian Economic Cooperation summit in St.Petersburg on January 25. It is there that the protocol on Uzbekistan's membership in the organization will be signed. In fact, the decision to join it was made last autumn when countesses of the Central Asian Community (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan) disbanded this structure and proclaimed the intention to join the Eurasian Economic Cooperation. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan had been its members since before, so the whole process was put into motion solely for Uzbekistan.

It may be added here that Central Asian countries' wandering from one international organization into another does not have anything to do with economic integration. The Central Asian Community has not accomplished a single proclaimed objective. Neither does the Eurasian Economic Cooperation exactly set an example of effectiveness, but membership of Uzbekistan in it is nevertheless a symbolic event, important for Tashkent itself and for Moscow. It took Uzbekistan but six months to become an outcast in the eyes of the international community last year. On May 13, Uzbek security structures crushed a rebellion in Andizhan killing between 700 and 1,500 people in the process, according to independent sources. Official Tashkent refused to have an independent investigation run and demanded withdrawal of the American military base from Uzbekistan shortly afterwards. China backed Karimov's actions, and Russia followed suit not long after that. The Kremlin kept receiving Karimov with warmth when the international community was introducing new and new sanctions against Tashkent.

And yet, Uzbekistan's image in the eyes of the international community is so bad that the authorities of Russia decided that being friends with it within the framework of international structures is better than individual friendship. That is why Uzbekistan is included in the regional organizations in the post-Soviet zone was it not previously involved with. The Eurasian Economic Community is but a feeler from this point of view. What official Moscow is really after is Uzbekistan's membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, the structure the Kremlin intends to transform into a military-political bloc like NATO. The Russian leadership would dearly like to have Karimov proclaim this membership at the summit in St.Petersburg later this month. It will enable Moscow to put into motion its plans and, for instance, establish a "counter-terrorism" base of the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization in Karshi-Khanabad where the Americans had their base once.

Thinking of the future

Joining the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization is important for Karimov too, and the symbolic membership in the Eurasian Economic Community is but a means to this end. And yet, the president of Uzbekistan has its own plans for the "pro-Russian NATO" which is intends to use to promote his own interests.

The thing is, power struggle in the upper echelons of the Uzbek establishment is particularly fierce now. The rumors can be heard in Tashkent every now and then that the president is ill, that he will never recover anymore, and that his inner circle is ready to launch an all-out fight for succession. The Interior Ministry and National Security Service with their heads Zakir Almatov and Rustam Inoyatov were regarded as the pillars of Karimov's regime until recently, but Almatov abandoned politics last year. Karimov withdrew the Internal Troops from the Interior Ministry and turned them over to the National Security Service soon after brutal suppression of the revolt in Andizhan. Almatov left the country then (he was operated on in Germany). Facing the threat of criminal charges in Germany, Almatov returned to Tashkent and resigned as interior minister. His resignation disrupted the balance of security structures and analysts pronounced a coup d'etat in Uzbekistan a distinct possibility.

It seems that Karimov feared a coup too, particularly after the events in Andizhan that some sources say were provoked by some secret service. Ever since last summer Karimov has been promoting the idea of international fast response forces that may be used to suppress rebellions or putsches.

It is this Karimov's idea precisely that is the essence of the treaty on relations of allies Moscow and Tashkent signed last October. Russia practically gave guarantees to Uzbekistan that it would help Tashkent with dealing with any revolt against Karimov.

And yet, the Uzbek authorities want more than that from Moscow. According to what information this newspaper has compiled, the Uzbek regime drafted a project of special international anti-revolutionary punitive forces for the post-Soviet zone, an institution the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization will serve as a perfect "umbrella" for. Joining the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization, Uzbekistan will suggest some rearrangements including establishment of intelligence and counterintelligence structures a and mechanisms enabling the Organization to guarantee internal security of Central Asian countries.

For the time being, Russia is not exactly happy with making the CIS Collective Security Treaty Organization a gendarme. Moscow wants this structure to become an Eurasian response to NATO, not a bodyguard for Central Asian governments. In the meantime, the Kremlin may reconsider its options yet. After all, official Tashkent knows now that the pampering Gazprom is a sure way to conquer the Russian authorities.

Kommersant, January 19, 2006, p. 9

© Translated by Ferghana.Ru